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INCENTIVIZING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF  











In order to encourage businesses to move to or expand in a 
particular location, local governments offer a wide variety of incentives 
to businesses.  These incentives take many forms, ranging from in-kind 
assistance, such as infrastructure improvements, to zoning and permit 
assistance to job training to various forms of tax abatements.  The 
incentives are often justified based on economic efficiency grounds if 
they can help overcome market failures such as labor immobility, wage 
rigidity, information asymmetries, and externalities due to factors such 
as urban sprawl.
1
  Incentives have also been justified in the presence of 
inequalities due to factors such as changing macroeconomic conditions, 
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1 TIMMOTHY J. BARTIK, WHO BENEFITS FROM STATE AND LOCAL 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES? (1991); Robert T. Greenbaum & Daniele 
Bondonio, Losing Focus: A Comparative Evaluation of Spatially Targeted 
Economic Revitalization Programmes in the US and the EU, 38 REGIONAL 
STUD. 319 (2004); Joseph Gyourko, Place-Based Aid Versus People-Based Aid 
and the Role of an Urban Audit in a New Urban Strategy, 3 CITYSCAPE: J. 
POL’Y DEV. & RES. 205 (1998). 
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concentrated poverty, aging infrastructure, or a workforce with skills 
that do not match the need of local employers.
2
 
Two of the most widely used incentives are below-market rate 
loans and grants, which both require rather large up-front capital 
investments by the offering governments.
3
  Because they do not have to 
be repaid, grants potentially offer governments a powerful tool for 
influencing businesses decisions.  However, because loans are repaid, 
they potentially offer governments a more economical way to attempt 
to sway businesses location and investment choices.  Not only is it 
unclear which approach is likely to be more effective, also unexplored 
is what types of governments are most likely to use grants or loans. 
More broadly, governments interchangeably use grants and 
subsidized loans to help accomplish diverse goals.  As a recent 
example, the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) 
was designed to help state and local governments recover from the 
Great Recession.
4
  Based on reports from recipients between February 
17, 2009, and December 31, 2010, ARRA provided $213.6 billion in 
grants and $7.5 billion in loans in addition to $39.5 billion in contracts.
5
  
It is still too early to determine the relative effectiveness of various 
forms of assistance. 
The larger question of the use of grants versus loans is by no 
means confined to the field of local economic development.  For 
example, it is a much more contentious issue in the field of 
international aid for economic development.  While some contend that 
loans impose more discipline on recipient counties and thus lead to the 
funding of more fiscally viable projects, others worry that loans can 
lead to unsustainable levels of debt in the recipient countries and that 
                                                 
2 Robert T. Greenbaum, Blair D. Russell & Tricia L. Petras, Measuring 
the Distribution of Economic Development Tax Incentive Intensity, 24 ECON 
DEV. Q. 154 (2010). 
3 See Rachel Weber, Why Local Economic Development Incentives Don’t 
Create Jobs: The Role of Corporate Governance, 32 URB. LAW. 97, 100 (2000). 
4 Nancy Johnson, Does the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
Meet Local Needs? 41 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 123, 123-27 (2009). 
5 Recipient Reported Awards Map, RECOVERY.GOV, 
http://www.recovery.gov/Transparency/RecipientReportedData/Pages/Recipien
tReportedDataMap.aspx (last updated May 25, 2011).  
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grants are therefore to be preferred.
6
  The financing of higher education 
is another area in which both grants and loans are widely used.  In a 
clever experiment, Field found evidence that students are debt averse.
7
  
New York University Law students were randomly assigned to two 
groups, both receiving financially equivalent financial aid packages.  
The students receiving loans that were forgivable if they took lower-
paying public interest law jobs after graduation were less likely to take 
that lower-paying job than students who were offered tuition grants that 




This paper explores the logic of local governments offering 
grants and loans to businesses as economic development incentives and 
draws on a 2009 survey of county and municipal governments to help 
discern among the characteristics that are associated with governments 
that offer grants, loans, both forms assistance, and neither form of 
assistance.  While both forms of assistance are found to be used among 
governments having had recent economic decline and among 
governments facing barriers to economic development, the forward 
selection stepwise logit regression analysis finds that a number of 
geographic and economic factors can help distinguish between grant 
and loan offering governments.
9
  In what follows, the authors first 
discuss the broader use and adoption of economic development 
incentives and then couch the use of grants and loans within the 
broader theory.  Then, there is a description of the empirical model, 
survey data, and results.  Finally, the conclusion includes comments 
about the findings. 
 
                                                 
6 See Sanjeev Gupta et al., Foreign Aid and Revenue Response: Does the 
Composition of Aid Matter? (IMF Fiscal Affairs Dep’t, Working Paper No. 
WP/03/176, 2003), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03176.pdf; see also Wilson E. 
Schmidt, The Economics of Charity: Loans versus Grants, 72 J. POL. ECON. 
387 (1964).  
7 Erica Field, Educational Debt Burden and Career Choice: Evidence 
From a Financial Aid Experiment at NYU Law School, 1 AM. ECON. J.: 
APPLIED ECON. 1 (2009). 
8 Id. 
9 See infra Table 8. 
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I.  ADOPTION OF GRANTS AND LOANS AS AN  
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TOOL 
 
Regardless of their effectiveness,
10
 economic development 
incentives offered directly to firms remain very popular among state 
and local governments.
11
  There are multiple factors that help explain 
why a particular government will decide to adopt such incentives, 
ranging from the health of the local economy to competition among 
communities to the characteristics of the communities themselves.  
There are also multiple factors involved in the decision of which 
particular incentives to use; below there is discussion of some of the 
factors that help distinguish between the use of grants and loans.   
The health of the local economy is often found to be one of the 
primary factors that affect the decision of whether to adopt economic 
development incentives.  Communities facing economic distress are 
often found to be more likely to adopt incentives because these policies 
are often focused on areas with high unemployment or poverty and 
lower housing values.
12
  However, this finding is not universal, and as 
Peters and Fisher note, less affluent communities are at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to wealthier communities in terms of the ability to 
offer generous incentives.
13
  Part of the difference in findings may also 
                                                 
10 The measured effectiveness varies considerably based on the particular 
incentives offered as well as factors such as when and where the programs were 
implemented and the monetary value of the incentives.  This variation may be a 
function of the measurement of different outcomes, use of different statistical 
evaluation techniques, as well as a function of offerings in places and times that 
vary based on the level of economic and socioeconomic distress, industry 
composition, competition, and availability of other forms of government 
assistance.  For additional discussion of differences in findings across studies, 
See Alan Peters & Peter Fisher, Commentary: The Failures of Economic 
Development Incentives, 70 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 27 (2004). 
11 Robert T. Greenbaum & Jim Landers, Why Are State Policy Makers Still 
Proponents of Enterprise Zones? What Explains their Action in the Face of a 
Preponderance of the Research? 32 INT’L REGIONAL SCI. REV. 466 (2009); 
Lingwen Zheng & Mildred Warner, Business Incentive Use Among U.S. Local 
Governments: A Story of Accountability and Policy Learning, 24 ECON. DEV. 
Q. 325 (2010). 
12 Robert T. Greenbaum, Siting it Right: Do States Target Economic 
Distress When Designating Enterprise Zones? 18 ECON. DEV. Q. 67 (2004); 
Irene S. Rubin & Herbert J. Rubin, Economic Development Incentives: The 
Poor (Cities) Pay More, 23 URB. AFF. Q.  37 (1987); Elaine B. Sharp, 
Institutional Manifestations of Accessibility and Urban Economic Development 
Polity, 44 W. POL. Q. 129 (1991). 
13 See Peters & Fisher, supra note 10, at 32-33. 
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be due to policy diffusion over time.  For example, when exploring 
time to first adoption of a local development incentive, Anderson and 
Wassmer found that communities with higher incomes and property 
values wait longer to adopt.
14
  Examining larger-scale programs at the 
national and supranational levels in the United State and the European 
Union, Greenbaum and Bondonio  similarly found that initial rounds of 
programming targeted more distressed areas than did subsequent 
rounds.
15
  The spread to less-distressed areas may be due to political 
pressures, whether they be at the stage of implementation in order to 
gain political approval
16
 or at later stages when it is difficult to end 
programs that are no longer needed or are ineffective.
17
  
Another factor influencing the decision to offer incentives is that 
communities may believe that they need to offer incentives to compete 
with neighboring communities, even if it leads to an inefficient 
prisoners’ dilemma outcome.
18
  There is empirical support for the 
contention that competition leads to incentive use, as Green and 
Fleischmann found that local incentives were more likely to be adopted 
in areas in which regional competition was more intense.
19
  Further, 
Anderson and Wassmer found evidence of communities over time 
offering incentives based not on their own characteristics but in 
response to the offers from other communities.
20
 
Other factors that have been found to be associated with the 
greater likelihood of incentive adoption include size and type of 
                                                 
14 J. E. Anderson & R.W. Wassmer, The Decision to ‘Bid for Business’: 
Municipal Behavior in Granting Property Tax Abatements, 25 REGIONAL SCI. 
& URB. ECON. 739 (1995). 
15 See Greenbaum & Bondonio, supra note 1. 
16 Jeffrey S. Lehman, Updating Urban Policy, in CONFRONTING POVERTY: 
PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE 226 (Sheldon H. Danziger et al. eds., 1994). 
17 See Field, supra note 7; Dafna Schwartz, Joseph Pelzman & Michael 
Keren, The Ineffectiveness of Location Incentive Programs, 22 ECON. DEV. Q. 
167 (2008). 
18 Stephen Ellis & Cynthia Rogers, Local Economic Development as a 
Prisoners’ Dilemma: The Role of Business Climate, 30 REV. OF REGIONAL 
STUD. 315 (2000). 
19 Gary P. Green & Arnold Fleischmann, Promoting Economic 
Development: A Comparison of Central Cities, Suburbs, and Nonmetropolitan 
Communities, 27 URB. AFF. Q. 145 (1991). 
20 See Anderson & Wassmer, supra note 14. 
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municipality.  Higher population,
21





 were more likely to adopt.  Further, both 
central cities and rural areas were found to use incentives more 
intensely than suburbs.
24
   
Given that a local government has made the decision to offer 
economic development incentives, there remains the issue of the form 
of the incentives.  Different forms of incentives have been popular at 
different times, and they vary among attraction strategies, business 
retention efforts, and broader efforts to improve the attractiveness and 
social conditions of the local area.
25
  Reese and Sands refer to the 
different trends of policy approaches over time as “fads,” ranging from 
approaches that focus on base industries that can export goods and 
services outside of the local economy, to approaches that focus on 




As an important part of many of these approaches, local 
governments use grants and loans to both attract and retain business 
activity.  Compared to other popular incentives such as tax abatements, 
which represent foregone future tax revenues and can be thought of as 
“tax expenditures,” both grants and loans typically require larger up-
front capital investments from the government.    
Loan programs can take numerous forms, but in most cases they 
include making subsidized below-market interest rate financing 
available to local businesses.  These “soft loans” may also include 
repayment terms that are more flexible than those offered by 
commercial financial institutions.  Soft loans can be useful to help 
businesses overcome credit market imperfections, which may limit the 
ability of new and small firms to finance otherwise viable projects.
27
  
                                                 
21 Arnold Fleischmann, Gary P. Green & Tsz Man Kwong, What’s a City 
to Do? Explaining Differences in Local Economic Development Policies, 45 W. 
POL. Q. 677 (1992).  
22 See Greenbaum, supra note 12. 
23 Laura A. Reese, Municipal Fiscal Health and Tax Abatement Policy, 5 
ECON. DEV. Q.  23 (1991).  
24 See Fleischmann, Green & Kwong, supra note 21. 
25 See Zheng & Warner, supra note 11.  
26 Laura Reese & Gary Sands, Creative Class and Economic Prosperity: 
Old Nostrums, Better Packaging? 22 ECON. DEV. Q.  3 (1998). 
27 Daniele Bondonio & Robert T. Greenbaum, Counterfactual Impact 
Evaluation of Enterprise Support Policies: An Empirical Application to EU Co-
Sponsored, National and Regional Programs (Ohio State Univ. John Glenn 
Sch. of Pub. Affairs, Working Paper, 2010), available at 
2011] INCENTIVIZING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 197  
 AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF 
 THE USE OF GRANTS AND LOANS 
 
Further, by the government either lending directly to the firms or by 
backing those loans, this can help the firms establish the credit records 
necessary to be able to borrow in the future from private financial 
institutions.  
Grants can be thought of as forgivable loans.  In that sense, they 
represent both a larger subsidy to the business and a larger cost to the 
government.  By providing the larger business subsidy, they have the 
potential to have greater influence on altering business decisions in the 
manner desired by the offering government.  However, the fact that 
they are not repaid makes them more costly to the local government, 
which can lead to greater fiscal stress.
28
  Indeed, many lending 
programs are set up as “revolving loans,” in which the money paid back 
(with interest) to the government can be lent again to other businesses.   
This tradeoff between grants potentially having the greater ability 
to alter decisions and loans being more cost effective means that a 
priori it is not clear which type of incentive is likely to be more 
effective in fostering economic development.  To examine this 
question, Bondonio and Greenbaum used Italian firm level data from 
eight national programs, ten regional programs, and seven European 
Union co-sponsored programs between 2001 and 2003 to compare the 
use of grants and loans.
29
  Using a three-step conditional difference-in-
difference model,
30
 the paper found that employment in firms increased 
the more generous the incentives.
31
  The paper also found that grants 
and loans both induced similar levels of employment, but that the cost 
per job was lower for the loans.  The implication was that the soft loans 
were thus a more fiscally efficient choice compared to grants.
32
 
One potential drawback from the use of grants or loans for 
recipients may be restrictions placed on their use.  Graham found that 
                                                                                                 
https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1811/46842/gs_wps_Bondonio_Gre
enbaum_2010-001.pdf?sequence=1. 
28 This can result in lower spending elsewhere, higher taxes, or fewer 
businesses incentivized. 
29 Bondonio & Greenbaum, supra note 27. 
30 This model includes a data pre-processing stage in which propensity 
score estimation is used to eliminate both the assisted and non-assisted firms 
that are outside of the common support.  That is, assisted (non-assisted) firms 
that have initial observable characteristics not comparable to other non-assisted 
(assisted) firms, and thus are not as useful from an evaluation perspective, are 
not included in the analysis. 
31 Bondonio & Greenbaum, supra note 27. 
32 Id. 
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grants and loans offered to small businesses in lower Manhattan 
subsequent to the September 11, 2001, attacks in some cases may have 
worked to the detriment of recipient businesses because of the 
requirement that the businesses had to rebuild in lower Manhattan.
33
  
Indeed, because of the reduced consumer demand after the attacks, 
some of the businesses that borrowed the subsidized loans became 
highly indebted and unable to pay back the loans due to the locational 
disadvantages.
34
  In other cases, during a slow economy when demand 
for loans is low and when commercial interest rates are similar to the 
subsidized loans, the restrictions attached to the government loans may 
turn off potential borrowers.
35
   
Because grants and loans are both used for projects that have 
larger up-front costs, such as start-up activities, expansions, relocations, 
or job training, it is not clear which types of governments will be more 
likely to use grants or loans.  The next section describes the empirical 
methodology used to examine those differences. 
II.  METHODS AND DATA 
 
In order to help identify the characteristics that help explain 
which governments adopt grants or loans as an economic development 
tool, both descriptive analysis and regression analysis is used.  
Municipal and county governments are categorized based on whether 
they offer grants, grants but not loans (“grants only”), loans, loans but 
not grants (“loans only”), both grants and loans, or neither grants nor 
loans.  The descriptive analysis examines whether there is variation 
across incentive offers based upon economic performance, economic 
development efforts, and perceived barriers to economic development. 
The multivariate regression analysis is used to examine the 
relationship between individual explanatory factors and the use of 
grants or loans while controlling for the impact of other factors.  
Because the dependent variable is the use or non-use of grants, loans, 
or grants and loans, logit models are appropriate.  The main intent of 
the regressions is to explore what factors help to best predict the use of 
                                                 
33 Leigh T. Graham, Permanently Failing Organizations? Small Business 
Recovery After September 11, 2001, 21 ECON. DEV. Q. 299 (2007).  
34 Id. 
35 Id.  In a recent example from Delaware County, Ohio, the revolving 
loan fund program was put in jeopardy because there were few businesses 
interested in taking the subsidized loans. Allison Manning, Business Loans 
Now Free But No Takers, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 24, 2011, at B1. 
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the different incentives.  Therefore, stepwise regressions are used.  The 
forward-selection stepwise procedure to estimate these logit regressions 
starts with a model with no variables and adds variables to the model as 
long as the p-value is less than 0.2 in order to find the best fitting 
model.  While such a procedure has some serious drawbacks,
36
 it can 
be useful for identifying the variables that help to predict the dependent 
variable.  To account for heteroscedastic error terms, robust standard 
errors are estimated. 
The basic model is as follows: 
Equation 1: Pr(Y=1) = f(location, type of 
government, past and future economic growth, 
intensity of economic development efforts, barriers to 
economic development)      
Equation 1 is estimated for five different dichotomous dependent 
variables, Y: offering of grants only (Model 1), loans only (Model 2), 
grants and loans (Model 3), grants
37
 (Model 4), and loans
38
 (Model 5).  
Location is captured by dummy variables capturing whether the state is 
in the north-central, south, or west part of the county.  The indicator for 
the northeast is the excluded dummy variable.  Location is also 
captured by dummy variables capturing whether the government is a 
core city, or for counties, a county containing a central city.  A dummy 
variable is also included to indicate whether the city or county is 
suburban.  The rural dummy is the excluded indicator.  A dummy 
variable is also included to capture whether the government is a county 
(=1 if the government is a county).  
Past growth is measured by a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
economic base grew over the past five years.  Another dummy variable 
is included that equals 1 if the economic base declined over the past 
five years.  Similarly, the respondents were asked to predict growth 
over the next five years.  Thus, the future growth dummy variable 
equals 1 if predicted growth is expected to be positive, and the future 
decline dummy variable equals 1 if predicted growth is expected to be 
negative.  In both cases, the excluded dummy variable is stable growth 
over the past or future five years.  Based upon the literature previously 
                                                 
36 See, e.g., M. J. R. Healy, Statistics from the Inside. 16. Multiple 
Regression (2), 73 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 270, 270 (1995). 
37 This coding includes governments that offer just grants and 
governments that offer both grants and loans. 
38 This coding includes governments that offer just loans and governments 
that offer both grants and loans. 
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reviewed, it is hypothesized that slower growing areas are more likely 
to use both grants and loans.
39
  
The intensity of the economic development efforts are measured 
by the natural log of the economic development budget in fiscal year 
2009 as well as the estimated number of jobs and business created by 
past attraction efforts.  It is expected that governments that use more 
intensive economic development efforts are also more likely to use 
grants and loans.  The final set of covariates measure perceived barriers 
to local economic development and include capital, population loss, 
location, tax, building, and infrastructure barriers.  Governments facing 
barriers to economic development are hypothesized to be more likely to 
adopt grants or loans. 
The descriptive analysis uses survey data from the 2009 
International City/County Management Association (ICMA) Economic 
Development Survey, which was mailed to all 3,283 municipalities 
with populations of at least 10,000 and all 556 counties with 
populations of 50,000 and above.  While non-respondents were sent a 
follow-up survey, and the survey was made available electronically, the 
response rate was only 22.2%.
40
  Thus, care must be taken when 
interpreting the descriptive analysis, as this sample is not necessarily 
representative of the entire population of larger municipalities and 
counties.  The ICMA economic development surveys have been used in 
the past to examine the adoption of economic development tools.
41
  The 
2009 survey asks some general questions about the local community 
and how it implements its economic development strategy.  The survey 
also asks questions about perceived barriers to development, specific 
development strategies and tools, and accountability. 
                                                 
39 See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text. 
40 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 2009 SURVEY SUMMARY, INT’L CITY/COUNTY 
MGMT. ASS’N 1 (2010) [hereinafter 2009 ICMA SURVEY], available at 
http://icma.org/en/icma/knowledge_network/documents/kn/Document/107026/
ICMA_2009_Economic_Development_Survey_Summary. 
41 See, e.g., Gary P. Green & Arnold Fleischmann, Promoting Economic 
Development: A Comparision of Central Cities, Suburbs, and Nonmetropolitan 
Communities, 27 URB. AFF. Q. 145 (1991); Arnold Fleischmann, Gary P. Green 
& Tsz Man Kwong, What's a City to Do? Explaining Differences in Loal 
Economic Develoment Policies, 45 W. POL. Q. 677 (1992) (comparing 
incentive use based on the 1984 ICMA survey); Lingwen Zheng & Mildred 
Warner, Business Incentive Use Among U.S. Local Governments: A Story of 
Accountability and Policy Learning, 24 ECON. DEV. Q. 325 (2010) (comparing 
trends in incentive use based on the 1994, 1999, and 2004 ICMA surveys). 
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Of the 844 survey respondents with usable data, 109 were 
counties or parishes, while the remainder was some form of municipal 
government, such as a city, village, or township.  Across all types of 
administrative structures, the vast majority (95.1%) reported that their 
governments offer some type of business incentives.
42
   
Among all 844 survey respondents, 205 (24%) reported that they 
offer low-cost loans, and 270 (32%) offer grants as economic 
development incentives.  This distribution can be seen in Table 1.  
Almost 14% of the governments (114) offer both grants and loans, and 
more than half (483) do not report offering either grants or loans. 
Table 1.  Governments offering Grants and Loans 
 Loans 
Grants Don’t offer* Offer Total 
Don’t offer* 483 91 574 
Offer 156 114 270 
All 639 205 844 
Source:  ICMA 2009 Economic Development Survey 
*Note:  “Don’t offer” includes 52 non-respondents. 
 
If part of the justification for offering particular incentives is 
either competing with or imitating the offerings in neighboring 
jurisdictions, there is likely to be some spatial clustering of particular 
incentives.  Indeed, as Table 2 shows,
43
 while 24% of the governments 
offer loans, this distribution ranges from a low of 19% in the southern 
states to a high of 30% in the north-central states.  While the southern 
states are the least likely to offer loans, they are the most likely to offer 
grants (43%).  Northeastern states are the least likely to offer grants 
(19%). 
                                                 
42 Fifty-two respondents did not answer this question. 2009 ICMA 
SURVEY, supra note 37. 
43 No surveys were returned from Hawaii or West Virginia. 
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Table 2.  Geographic Distribution of Governments Offering Grants and Loans 

















Northeast 112 13% 21 19% 23 21% 15 13% 
North-
Central 
273 32% 90 33% 82 30% 45 16% 
South 265 31% 114 43% 50 19% 35 13% 
West 194 23% 45 23% 50 26% 19 10% 
All 844 100% 270 32% 205 24% 114 14% 
Source:  ICMA 2009 Economic Development Survey 
 
This geographic distribution is displayed visually in Figure 1, 
which shows the darkest shading (higher percentages of responding 
governments offering grants) in the in southern states, and Figure 2, 
which shows that the north-central states have the highest percentage of 
survey respondents offering loans. 
 
Figure 1.  Geographic Distribution of Governments offering Grants 
Source:  ICMA 2009 Economic Development Survey 
Note:  Hawaii and West Virginia had no survey responses  
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Figure 2. Geographic Distribution of Governments offering Loans 
 
Source:  ICMA 2009 Economic Development Survey  
Note:  Hawaii and West Virginia had no survey responses 
 
III.  RESULTS 
 
To investigate the hypothesis that more distressed economies are 
more likely to adopt economic development incentives than less 
distressed areas, survey questions that asked about the performance of 
the economy over the past five years were used.  Respondents were 
also asked to project economic performance over the next five years.  
Various growth ranges were provided on the survey; then, the 
numerous categories of growth ranges were converted into 
dichotomous variables that equaled 1 if the reported growth was 
positive (for the growth indicator) or negative (for the decline 
indicator).  Table 3 summarizes the previous five-year estimates and 
future five-year growth predictions for governments that used neither 
grants nor loans, governments that used grants or loans only, and 
governments that used both grants and loans.  It is clear from the table 
that counties and cities that had positive growth were less likely to use 
grants and loans as economic development tools, as 74% of the 
governments using neither incentive had positive previous growth.    
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More telling, only 10% of those governments had negative growth over 
the past five years, while 16% of governments using only grants and 
19% of governments using only loans had negative growth.  No clear 
patterns are evident among predictions of future growth or decline, as 
the 9% of non-offering governments predicting future decline matched 
the overall mean. 
 
Table 3.  Percent of Governments with Economic Base Growth or Decline 
  Past 5 Years 
Predicted Future 5 
Years 




483 74% 10% 75% 9% 
Grants 
Only 
156 72% 16% 74% 6% 
Loans 
Only 
91 70% 19% 74% 9% 
Grants & 
Loans 
114 69% 19% 70% 12% 
All 844 73% 14% 74% 9% 
Source:  ICMA 2009 Economic Development Survey  
 
While the governments not offering grants and loans reported 
that they were more likely to have grown their economies in the past 
five years, they were also less likely to attribute their growth to 
economic development efforts.  As shown in Table 4, governments 
offering grants only or loans only claimed many more firms and jobs 
created due to their efforts than the governments not offering either.  As 
noted above, almost all governments offered incentives, even if they 
did not take the form of grants or loans.  Interestingly, governments 
offering both grants and loans claimed to have induced approximately 
the same number of new firms (53) as the non-grant or loan offering 
governments (50).  However, the governments offering both grants and 
loans did claim to have induced more jobs (1,978) than the non-
offering governments (1,162).  Note that this table is merely 
descriptive, as it  refrains not only from controlling for factors such as 
the size of the local economies or the intensity of the development 
efforts, but also it does not validate the estimates of jobs or businesses 
created through any kind of evaluation methodology.  Table 5 provides 
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some indication of the intensity of the development efforts, as the 
economic development budgets in fiscal year 2009 of governments 
offering grants only ($1.9 million) and governments offering loans only 
($2.1 million) was much larger than the average development budget of 
governments offering neither grants nor loans ($0.7 million).  
Table 4.  Estimated Business and Job Growth over the Past Five Years 
Attributed to Development Activities 
Incentive N Firms Jobs 
Neither Grants nor 
Loans 
483 49.77 1,161.71 
Grants Only 156 106.00 2,092.81 
Loans Only 91 84.54 1,847.26 
Grants & Loans 114 52.98 1,977.66 
All 844 65.05 1,553.68 
Source:  ICMA 2009 Economic Development Survey 
 
Table 5.  Fiscal Year 2009 Economic Development Budget in Millions 
of Dollars 
Incentive N Budget 
Neither Grants nor Loans 483 $0.71 
Grants Only 156 $1.9 
Loans Only 91 $2.1 
Grants & Loans 114 $1.7 
All 844 $1.3 
Source:  ICMA 2009 Economic Development Survey 
 
Economic development incentives are typically used to attempt 
to address market failures or particular competitive disadvantages in a 
local economy.  Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for six of those 
challenges, ranging from concerns regarding capital or funding to 
infrastructure challenges.  In almost all cases, governments using 
neither grants nor loans were less likely to report these factors to be 
barriers to economic development.  Of note, governments offering 
loans only were much more likely to claim that their geographic 
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location (“distance from markets”) was a barrier (25%) than 
governments offering grants only (13%) or governments offering 
neither grants nor loans (14%).  For tax, building availability, and 
infrastructure challenges, governments offering grants only or grants 
and loans found these to be larger barriers than governments offering 
loans only or not offering grants or loans. 

















483 42% 6% 14% 18% 31% 41% 
Grants 
Only 
156 56% 10% 13% 20% 41% 62% 
Loans 
Only 
91 54% 11% 25% 15% 35% 57% 
Grants & 
Loans 
114 53% 15% 16% 27% 45% 78% 
All 844 47% 9% 15% 19% 35% 51% 
Source:  ICMA 2009 Economic Development Survey 
 
To estimate regressions, all of the surveys that had missing 
observations for any of the variables were dropped.  That left 392 
surveys.  The full set of descriptive statistics for all of the variables 
included in the stepwise regressions for these 392 observations is 
reported in Table 7.  For this subset of observations, 38% provided 
grants, 20% provided grants only,
44
 30% provided loans, 12% provided 
loans only, and 18% provided both grants and loans.  The vast majority 
were urban or suburban:  26% were core cities or counties containing a 
core city, and 55% were suburban. For the most part, these 392 




                                                 
44 That is, the governments did not provide loans. 
45 2009 ICMA SURVEY, supra note 37. 
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Fraction of Governments Offering  
  Grants 
0.378 
(0.485) 
  Grants Only (no loans) 
0.196 
(0.398) 
  Loans 
0.304 
(0.460) 
  Loans Only (no grants) 
0.122 
(0.328) 
  Both Grants and Loans 
0.181 
(0.386) 
Fraction of Governments in   
  Northeast 
0.102 
(0.303) 
  North Central 
0.327 
(0.470) 
  South 
0.329 
(0.470) 
  West 
0.242 
(0.429) 
Fraction of Governments that are  
  Core City or County Containing a Central City 
0.255 
(0.436) 
  Suburban City or County 
0.548 
(0.498) 
  County Governments 
0.140 
(0.348) 
Fraction of Economies Reported to Have  
  Grown over Past 5 Years 
0.755 
(0.431) 
  Declined Past 5 Years 
0.110 
(0.313) 
Fraction of Economies Predicted to  
  Grow Next 5 Years 
0.750 
(0.434) 
  Decline Next 5 Years 
0.0944 
(0.293) 
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Natural Log FY09 Economic Development Budget 
12.41 
(1.757) 
Fraction Reporting Barriers to Economic Development  
  Lack of Capital or Funding 
0.513 
(0.500) 
  Declining Market because of Population Loss 
0.0842 
(0.278) 
  Location too Distant from Major Markets 
0.179 
(0.383) 
  Taxes 
0.204 
(0.404) 
  Lack of Building Availability 
0.388 
(0.488) 
  Inadequate Infrastructure 
0.316 
(0.466) 
Natural log of the estimated   
Jobs Created due to Attraction Efforts 
6.240 
(1.590) 
Businesses Created due to Attraction Efforts 
2.799 
(1.483) 
Number of Observations 392 
Source:  Analysis Based on ICMA 2009 Economic Development Survey 
 
Regression results predicting the likelihood of using grants or 
loans are reported in Table 8.  One important advantage of the 
regression analysis is that it is a multivariate approach.  That is, it can 
provide an estimate of the impact of any one of the factors on the 
likelihood of offering the incentive, holding constant the other factors.  
The coefficients are reported in Table 8 if they loaded in the model—
that is, if the p-value associated with the coefficient was less than 0.2 
when the stepwise procedure entered the variable into the model.  The 
coefficients from the logit regression, when positive, are interpreted 
such that the presence of that variable (for the dichotomous variables) 
or an increase in the variable (for the continuous variables) leads to an 
increased probability of the government offering the particular 
incentive.  Negative coefficients indicate a decreased probability of 
offering the incentive. 
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Table 8.  Stepwise (Forward Selection) Logit Results of Models 
Predicting Likelihood to Adopt Grants or Loans as Economic 
Development Incentives 
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Observations 392 392 392 392 392 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses 
            *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
When examining the location variables, the location coefficients 
are interpreted relative to the northeastern states, as the northeast 
variable is the excluded location dummy variable.
46
  Consistent with 
the descriptive analysis, observations from southern states were 
statistically significantly more likely to offer grants only.  Interestingly, 
compared to northeastern states, being in a north-central or western 
state also increased the probability that the government offered grants 
only (Model 1).  In the model predicting all grant-offering governments 
(Model 4), only the north-central and south coefficients were included 
in the model as significant regressors.  For loans only (Model 2) and all 
loans (Model 5), governments in southern states were less likely to 
offer loans, all else equal.  The impact of locational factors for the 
governments offering both grants and loans (Model 3) is similar to 
those offering loans. 
Other factors helping to predict governments offering only grants 
(Model 1) include being in an urban area (both the core city and 
suburban variables loaded), being a county government rather than a 
municipality, and having endured economic decline over the past five 
years.  However, respondents predicting economic decline over the 
next five years were less likely to have adopted grants.   
                                                 
46 In models 2-5, additional location dummy variables were not loaded 
into the model.  For each of these models, the coefficients on the location 
dummy variables are interpreted relative to all of the excluded categories. 
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Unlike with the grants regressions and with the descriptive 
analysis in Table 3, past economic decline did not help to predict 
governments using only loans (Model 2). Also, being a suburban 
government reduced the probability that a government would offer 
loans.  For the all-loans regression (Model 5), being a core city or 
county containing a central city also reduced the likelihood of offering 
loans.  This finding that governments in urban areas are less likely to 
offer loans may be why the north-central coefficients did not load in the 
all-loans regressions despite the visual evidence in Figure 2.  After 
controlling for whether the local government was in an urban area, the 
actual location in the rural northeast did not matter.  Consistent with the 
descriptive statistics in Table 5, governments with larger economic 
development budgets were more likely to offer loans.  Interestingly, the 
more jobs estimated to have been created due to economic attraction 
efforts, the lower the probability that the government offered loans.  
However, the more businesses estimated to have been created due to 
development efforts, the more likely the government offered loans.  
This may be evidence that loans have been targeted more frequently at 
attracting businesses than at expanding employment. 
For the most part, the coefficients on the variables measuring 
barriers to economic development were not significant in the 
multivariate analysis.  The one exception is the dummy variable 
capturing the perception that lack of capital and funding was a barrier.  
For the governments that reported this barrier, they were less likely to 
offer loans (Model 2)
47
 and more likely to offer grants and loans 
together (Model 3) or offer any grants (Model 4).  This result for loans 
is somewhat surprising, as loans directly address capital market 
imperfections.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The descriptive analysis in this paper was consistent with 
previous research that has generally found that more distressed 
communities are more likely to adopt economic development 
incentives.  In the bivariate analysis, governments that used grants, 
loans, or both were more likely to have faced economic decline over 
the previous five years than were governments that used neither grants 
nor loans.   However, in the stepwise logit regression analysis, which 
controls for the influence of other factors, previous economic decline 
                                                 
47 This, however, is statistically significant only at the 10% level. 
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was only useful in helping to predict grant use.  Perhaps these 
governments facing economic distress felt the need to use incentives 
that provided a more generous benefit to the recipient firms.  Or, 
perhaps consistent with the analysis of Peters and Fisher, these 




The findings were also somewhat consistent with previous 
findings that incentive use may be influenced by either competition or 
by imitative behavior.  The maps showed some clustering of incentive 
use, where grants tended to be more highly utilized in southern states 
and loans in the north-central states.  The regression analysis was 
consistent with the finding that southern states were more likely to use 
grants.  The regressions also found that southern states were less likely 
to use loans.  However, the multivariate regression analysis did not find 
that north-central states were more likely to use loans.  Perhaps the 
bivariate analysis was driven partially by the fact that the north-central 
states tend to have fewer governments, and hence fewer governments in 
the survey.  Thus, the finding in the bivariate analysis that a higher 
percentage of these governments used loans may have been spurious.  
However, the regression results did find that suburban governments 
were less likely to use loans and did not find any relationship between 
central cities and loan use; therefore, perhaps the greater use of loans in 
the north-central states is due more to their rural status than to their 
geographic location.  Being a central or suburban location did increase 
the probability that a government used grants. 
Governments spending more on economic development efforts 
used more grants and loans on average, and this result was significant 
for all but the grants-only regression.  In the regression analysis, 
business attraction, and not job creation, was related to loan use, 
providing evidence that governments participating in the survey used 
loans more as a tool for business attraction rather than job creation. 
Finally, while governments facing barriers to development were 
more likely to use grants and loans based on the bivariate analysis, only 
the lack of capital or funding as a barrier was a statistically significant 
factor in the regression analysis.  Governments facing financing 
barriers, contrary to expectations, were less likely to use loans but were 
more likely to use grants. 
                                                 
48 See Alan Peters & Peter Fisher, The Failures of Economic Development 
Incentives, 70 J. AM. PLANNING ASS’N, 27 (2004), available at 
www.crcworks.org/cfscced/Fisher.pdf. 
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This analysis shows that while grants and loans are often used in 
some similar circumstances, there are also some important differences 
that help distinguish their use.  While many of the findings were 
consistent with expectations, care must be taken not to attribute the 
results to the larger population of local governments given that the 
response rate to the 2009 ICMA Economic Development survey was 
only 22%.
49
  Whether or not grant use or loan use is a more effective 
local economic development tool should be the focus of future 
research.
                                                 
49 2009 ICMA SURVEY, supra note 37.   
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